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
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
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A REARMED JAPAN: IMPLICATIONS

by

Harry Charles Stoddard

June 1980

Thesis Advisor:

Claude A. Buss

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It is also shown that the pursuit of an independent military course for Japan will not occur in the near future, but that the American-Japanese relationship will undergo changes directed at greater autonomy for Japan.

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A Rearmed Japan: Implications

by

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requirements for the degree of

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## ABSTRACT

This thesis is a study of Japan's emerging role as a regional arms exporter and the associated linkages of resource scarcity, economic vulnerability, and security dependency.

Evidence is provided for analysis of Japan's approach to each of these factors and the strategic implications for the major actors of this region. The conclusions are that Japan is emphasizing an increased military capability associated with threat perceptions of the Soviet Union and that one economical approach to rearming Japan is for it to become an arms exporter to the Pacific Basin region.

It is also shown that the pursuit of an independent military course for Japan will not occur in the near future, but that the American-Japanese relationship will undergo changes directed at greater autonomy for Japan.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY -----	6
II.	JAPANESE ATTITUDES TOWARD SECURITY -----	9
	A. BACKGROUND -----	10
	B. CURRENT STATUS -----	12
	C. JAPAN'S OPTIONS -----	20
III.	INDEFINITE FUTURE: CONTINUED DEPENDENCE -----	30
	A. RESOURCES -----	32
	B. DOMESTIC REARMAMENT -----	36
	C. THE FRENCH CONNECTION -----	41
	D. JAPAN'S DEFENSE BUDGET -----	48
	E. SUMMATION -----	50
IV.	STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF AUTONOMY -----	53
	A. THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL INTEREST -----	54
	B. PACIFIC BASIN INTEREST -----	57
	C. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS -----	67
	D. THE U. S. RESPONSE -----	79
V.	CONCLUSIONS - WHAT THE INDICATORS AND VARIABLES SUGGEST -----	81
	FOOTNOTES -----	86
	BIBLIOGRAPHY -----	93
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST -----	100



## I. INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

Japan enjoyed a unique position in the world prior to the October 1973 war between the Arab and Israeli factions in the Middle East. This position was one of political fence-sitting and of propagating a foreign policy that supported and protected an enormous but vulnerable economy. The events of 1973 and more recent events of political instability, economic uncertainty, and increased Soviet aggression have combined with an inauspicious perception of American international will to create a mixture that has awakened and stirred the security interests of the sleeping Japanese giant.

Japan's leadership had perceived their role in the Pacific Basin as apolitical. But the realization that Japan is the keystone between the world's supreme nuclear powers, its largest economies, its leaders in communist ideology and its strongest democracy, and that they all face potential conflict over competition for political and economic influence, world-wide, has helped reshape Japan's egoistic perception of itself. The national interests of these regional actors (the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China) all have a profound effect on the direction and degree of Japanese political, economic and military reactions in the future.

China is attempting a modernization program that is designed to prepare it for a new place in the world order. To accomplish this, China is turning away from its Asian-centrism cocoon and flexing its economic and military wings. The Soviet Union, influenced by paranoic fears of being completely surrounded by imperialistic capitalists with immense industrial capabilities, continues to practice at hegemonic adventurism. The United States' interests are no longer centered on the low-threat, off-shore environments that demand only modest commitments of U. S. forces for protection. Japan is a major world economic power with a diversity of trading partners and markets that require protection. The giant has rubbed the sleep from its eyes and has come to assume that to ensure its economic security, it must possess a military power commensurate with its commercial power.

It is now up to the United States to assess and respond to this renewed perception of military power in Japan. The options must be explored and the action taken cannot be tentative. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the alternatives Japan has on this road toward rearmament and the implications in relationship to the options Japan can take.

In very general terms, Japan has two options: to solely rely on the U.S.-Japanese Mutual Defense Treaty for

security and continued dependency on its western ally for an indefinite period; or Japan can maintain the security treaty while progressing toward a position of increased self-reliance on indigenous sources of production and manpower for its security, continuing to seek viable diplomatic alternatives. Either option necessitates an exploration of certain variables. This thesis will explore the variables associated with resource accessibility and security, and the political acceptability, both internationally and domestically, of the security options confronting Japan.

The investigation of these variables will analyze evidence for the hypothesis that because of Japan's geo-economic position in the world and its enormous stake in maintaining international stability, Japan will overcome the political objections to accepting more responsibility for its security and the economic cost associated with each plateau on this climb toward increasing indigenous defense. It will also demonstrate that Japan increasingly accepts the proposition that progress toward this pinnacle is essential for the protection of its security and its national interests in the international economy.

## II. JAPANESE ATTITUDES TOWARD SECURITY

"Rich Country, Strong Army" - Meiji Slogan

It can be said with certainty that Japanese domestic attitudes toward security have changed dramatically since October 1973. Some factors that have influenced this attitude realignment are:

- . The Arab oil embargo and accompanied crisis
- . A withdrawal of U. S. troops from the Pacific Basin to one-half the pre-Vietnam intervention level
- . The U. S.-China rapprochement with Taiwanese implications
- . An announcement of the "swing strategy" (flexible response) for U. S. forces from the Pacific Basin to Western Europe in the event of a crisis
- . Soviet imperialistic aggression and hegemonic adventurism in the Pacific Basin and in the oceans adjacent to Japan
- . The lack of a resolution to the northern territories situation
- . A military build-up in North Korea
- . International political instability
- . The Iranian revolution and American reaction
- . The penetration of Japanese air defense perimeter by a Soviet pilot in a MIG-25 Foxbat
- . The Soviet-Vietnamese Peace and Friendship Treaty<sup>1</sup>

These are factors that are shaping current Japanese domestic attitudes on defense, but before the current status on

security is explained further, it is necessary to understand and investigate the recent past of Japanese defense perceptions concerning the issues associated with national security.

#### A. BACKGROUND

The Japanese views on defense issues in the past have appeared to be diverse in nature, but with certain common factors that resulted in a defense decision-making attitude characterized by acquiescence. These factors were:

Post-1945 apprehensions. The emotional wounds of Japan's defeat in World War II were wide and deep. The leadership of post-1945 Japan had doubts concerning the utilization of military power as a means to achieving political ends internationally. Even those who still adhered to the Meiji principles of Samurai origin and placed great importance on military matters had to assent to the attitudes of the majority, modifying their views for the sake of presenting a united front through acquiescence.

Decline of militaristic values. With the American occupation forces came a Japanese government dominated by civilian leaders. The old martial virtues that lead to conflict, patriotism, discipline and self-sacrifice were too recent to forget. Resources had been shifted away from the military sector for societal welfare.

No external threat perception. Japan enjoyed a unique position in the world that lasted for three decades. Japan's national interests were not endangered by any external threat, it perceived no enemies, the economy flourished and the cost for this security was nominal. The only threat that was perceived during the post-1945 to October 1973 period was the Korean War<sup>2</sup>, but even its impact was offset by the economic advantages gained by supplying U.N. armies with materials at low cost (less transportation) and Japan's alliance with America. Also during this period (1945-1973) the

Japanese were preoccupied with their ostrich syndrome - if no threat is perceived, then there is no threat. It was not necessary to think about threats to security during this period as long as the Japanese were willing to place credence in the U. S. security guarantee.

Constitutional constraints. The American occupation, the only occupation by foreigners, was not popular, but the constitutional restraint on offensive military forces and equipment met with public approval, as did the limits imposed on expenditures for military items. This allowed investments in capital items, increased economic growth and a high standard of living.

A negative reaction by Pacific trading partners. The members of ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) and Japan's other Pacific Basin trading partners have expressed apprehension concerning a prospect of revival of a militaristic Japan. Japanese business leaders would enjoy a more secure military position but are conservative in nature and respond to the desires of their foreign associates.<sup>3</sup>

American/Soviet/Chinese detente and diplomacy. In the past American detente efforts were believed to have reduced the prospects of war, thus reducing Japan's need for indigenous security. The U. S.-Chinese rapprochement also lessened the necessity for activism on defense issues in the Japanese government.

These pre-1973 defense attitudes expressed by the above factors are indicators of a Japanese defense policy that was announced in May 1957.<sup>4</sup> Although many of these attitudes are prevalent today, they are not a consensus any longer. The recent events in and around the Pacific Basin have altered Japanese attitudes regarding the security force necessary for defense of its national interests.

## B. CURRENT STATUS

The Japanese first acknowledged a change in threat perception in their 1978 Defense White Paper: "Both in Europe and the Far East, the strength of Soviet forces now surpasses that of the U. S."<sup>5</sup> Today a new national consensus on defense and security issues is developing in Japan. The factors responsible for this perception transformation were stated clearly at the beginning of this chapter. The following statistical data are supportive of this recent perception transformation.

Once a year the Prime Minister's office conducts a survey on Japanese attitudes toward the self defense force. Here are the results for 1973 and 1979.

Question: Should the SDF be retained? 1973 - 73% of respondents favored retention, 12% were in opposition to retention, and 15% had no opinion. In 1979, 86% favored retention of the SDF, 10% opposed retention, and 13% had no opinion.

Question: How do you think Japan should protect its security? 1972 - 41% favored maintaining present U. S.-Japan security agreement and SDF, 16% opposed both, and 12% wanted treaty terminated and SDF bolstered, while 31% expressed no opinion.

In 1979, 50% favored present agreement, 6% opposed both, but 23% wanted the SDF strengthened, while only 21% expressed no opinion.<sup>6</sup>

What factors have affected this dramatic transformation in Japanese domestic attitudes toward security and their alliance with the United States? In the past, Japanese defense decision-making was hampered by the psychological wounds that had been inflicted on their leaders and the political scars associated with the post-war atmosphere of Japan. Three popular attitudes of the post-war period have undergone an alteration since 1973:

- 1) Concern regarding a revival of militarism and its feared consequences has diminished.<sup>7</sup>
- 2) The utility of military power in the international and domestic environments has gained popular publicity.<sup>8</sup>
- 3) Japan no longer feels safe in the conviction that as long as it does not engage in rearming or in foreign military entanglements, it is threatened by no external enemies.

All of these factors are relevant, but the third factor, a decline in the belief that future security is assured so long as Japan's overt foreign policies are perceived as pacific in nature, has had the most profound effect on domestic attitudes. Associated with this new feeling of insecurity is the perception of projected military intentions of the Soviet Union in Northeast Asia, in the event of a war. Japan (along with other nations within this region) is now facing the political realism of the expanded activity and scope of Soviet presence. The importance of this factor is receiving more genuine examination vis a vis the nuclear and conventional canopy offered by the United States.



Soviet objectives and diplomacy focus on Tokyo in North-east Asia. By using intimidating tactics, reinforced by frequent displays of Soviet air and naval superiority adjacent to or within Japanese territorial sea and air space, they have attempted to impress the Japanese body politic.<sup>9</sup> But the political results the Kremlin had hoped to gain by their display of bold "Soviet Diplomacy" have instead only intensified tensions between the Soviet Union and Japan, and magnified Japanese public support for the U. S.-Japanese Mutual Security Treaty.

Japanese defensive concerns have increased in recent months with the deployments of the Minsk and the Ivan Rogov to the Pacific Fleet base out of Vladivostok, Backfire bomber deployments to Kamchatka, and increases in Soviet ground forces (between 10,000 and 12,000) on the new military bases located less than 40 miles from the Hokkaido coast on the Kurile Islands of Kunishiri and Etorofu. Of concern throughout this region is the basing of Bear reconnaissance aircraft in Danang and the Soviet naval use of Cam Ranh Bay. The Japanese Defense White Paper of 1979 expresses anxiety over the Soviet's use of Vietnamese bases: "Especially, if the Soviet military forces intend permanent use of airports, harbors, and other facilities in Indo-China, it will affect the military balance between the U. S. and the U.S.S.R. . . . It will not only affect the peace of that area

and the safety of Japan's sea lines of communications, but also will impose restrictions on activities of the Western countries in areas surrounding the area. Japan, therefore, has a concern over the utilization of airports, harbors, and other facilities in Indo-China by the Soviet military forces."

With public opinion now strongly in favor of maintaining a Self Defense Force and a reaffirmation of the utility and value of the U. S. alliance, Japan would be able to proceed with a revitalization of both its defense relations with the United States, and a qualitative build-up of its indigenous defense structure, which will allow Japan to more effectively cope with limited or small scale invasions.

The facts being as they are, the logical question of interest to the majority of international studies scholars is: what concrete steps are being initiated in Japan to integrate these facts into action? In examining this question one may find clues to the answer in the character of the Japanese people and their leaders.

The Japanese culture, like that of China, has its foundations in the traditional ritual concepts of its ancestors. And like the Chinese, the Japanese had (prior to their defeat in World War II) a perception of Japan as the central power figure in Asia and conceivably the world. This could be termed the Yamato Concept. This concept

was introduced into Japanese culture sometime during the seventh century A.D. Apparently the Japanese had a need for a more complex form of government and decided to borrow it from their highly civilized and sophisticated neighbors, the Chinese. The new form of government was based on the "Son of Heaven" concept with an imperial bureaucracy based on competitive examination. At this time a clan system had been the government in Japan and it was not long before the dominant Yamato clan chief ascended to the position of emperor, a direct descendent of "the Sun Goddess."<sup>10</sup> This centralized governmental concept was not the only thing the Japanese borrowed from China, but it is the object of this discussion.

The object is the Japanese concept of a "divine land." This concept has developed over the centuries and had to be a factor at the start of World War II. The Japanese, partly due to the insularity of their physical geographic position in the Pacific Basin, and in part due to their religious and governmental concepts, believe that each plant, animal, person and nation-state has its proper place or station in life. Japan's place or station in life or the world order is as the political, economic and now because of the two preceding positions, military guide for the Pacific Basin and Northeast Asia. The concept is directly linked to the Yamato Concept of government and is being rehabilitated today.

There is still another factor that is persuasive today in Japan: the Meiji restoration. This period, which began in early 1868, led to a succession of reformations that eventually modernized the political and social structure of Japan.

There are many elements of the Meiji period that are still evident today. The Meiji leaders recognized that progression in the industrial sector could not be sustained without a supporting infrastructure. This infrastructure encompassed the sectors of mass education, based on American and German designs; a bank system based on Western design, and a modern transportation system. The Japanese, during the Meiji restoration, turned to the West, as their ancestors had turned toward China centuries before.

A slogan during the Meiji period was quoted at the beginning of this chapter. The latter portion of the slogan, "strong army," refers to Japanese problems of national security. There was great emphasis placed on military matters by Meiji leaders. A national desire during this period, as there is today, was the attainment of industrial and technological equality with the West.<sup>11</sup>

This national goal of equality with the West led to an expansionistic foreign policy in pre-war Japan, spearheaded by the Greater East Asia Co -Prosperity Sphere. This pre-war foreign policy had been succeeded by an acquiescent omnidirectional policy after the defeat of World War II that

was imperialistic from an economic perspective. The Japanese now have economic and industrial linkages not only in East Asia but with almost every major industrial power and with a variety of third world raw material sources. The Japanese economic hold on some western economies is considered, by some, to be quite strong and potentially dangerous.

Economic imperialism can also be considered economic diversification. Since the Japanese do not have a military force to protect their vital interests overseas, they have had to modify their foreign policy in order to gain some security for the continued flow of natural resources, especially oil. Their omnidirectional foreign policy now includes the Middle East. Japan's program of economic diversification incorporates Japanese control of indigenous oil production in this region. To date the success of this program has been limited.<sup>12</sup> But through financial and technological investments in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Basin, Japan hopes to increase its autonomous supplies of energy. The goal, an attainment of 30% of domestic requirements from Japanese owned or operated foreign sources, has an achievement target date of 1985.<sup>13</sup>

The decades of modernization (four) that are associated with the Meiji period can be compared to the decades of restoration following World War II. There is an analogy here, but is there a direct linkage between the two periods? Will

the armed forces of Japan again politically dominate the government as they did during the decades that followed the Meiji restoration? Will there be an expansionistic foreign policy leading to control of the vital resources Japan depends on so absolutely?

Indicators of Japan's movement toward a government dominated by military thought and leaders are difficult to detect. Even steps toward a modernization of the SDF (Self Defense Force) could be debated because of the duality and vacillation in almost every domestic and international policy the Japanese government pursues. One reason for this vacillation of policy in Japan is cultural in context and the other is constitutional. There is a cultural trait in the Japanese people that cannot be dismissed. This is duality of personality. The Japanese generally are very peaceful and contemplative in nature. They enjoy and employ the artistic ability they have in all areas of their cultural spectrum. Yet there is a dichotomy to this nature of Japan's life and culture. They can at times be violent and atrocious in their actions. This is one reason, but it is only part of the total question on governmental policy vacillation.

The other reason is that since World War II there has not been a charismatic leader that could unite the different party factions. Most leaders in Japan do not come from an individual party for this reason, but attain their positions

through the bureaucratic process. This period of factionalism and vacillation in government lead to the ultra-nationalist assassinations of the 1930's and to a military coup that followed. What options does Japan have today, when many of the problems today may have linkages with the problems of the past? Are the options any different?

### C. JAPAN'S OPTIONS

Except for China, Japan now has, by far, the largest military budget in Asia.<sup>14</sup> Although Japan still remains near the politically acceptable limit of 1%<sup>15</sup> of the gross national product for military expenditures, the 1979 expenditures were over \$9.5 billion, placing Japan in the top ten for military expenditures worldwide.<sup>16</sup>

In the past ten years, Japan's military budget had increased at an average rate of 8% per year. At first glance, one could attribute this increase to worldwide economic inflation. When the increase is contrasted to a NATO budget decrease of 2% per year over the same period, various conclusions can be drawn. In 1978 the Japanese military budget was only 0.9% of the gross national product, but the figure equates to over 5% of the Japanese national budget.<sup>17</sup>

The 1978 Japanese defense report (the White Paper) strongly stated that they no longer believe the United States Seventh Fleet is capable of protecting Japanese sea

lines, and therefore oil supplies against Soviet interdiction. This is a crucial factor for Japan: the Japanese have no natural resources except for solar and tidal power, and they rely entirely on shipping for oil/mineral/material imports and a majority of commercial exports.<sup>18</sup>

The decade of the 1980's will provide Japan with the opportunity to make some critical choices concerning its national security. The spectrum is wide and so are the choices. But one fact remains clear, no matter which choice Japan accepts or, because of circumstances is forced to accept, the options will clearly have an economic aspect to them. The options range from total unilateral military disarmament on one extreme of the spectrum to offensive nuclear rearmament on the other extreme.

In any examination of Japan's options for security in the future, one must be aware of another Japanese cultural trait that will influence any decision - a strong preference for the status quo. This preference enables them to concentrate their limited resources in the sector of their society that they receive the most benefit from. Japan, like all industrial nations, is concerned with its continued prosperity and its potential for growth in the future. Yet like other industrial nations, it must face the reality that there may be limits to growth and that the world's natural resources are, as yet, vague and undetermined.



If one were to make a list of possible options for Japan's future, two factors would have to be considered: Japan's economic and military security and the U. S.-Japanese defense relationship. The current Japanese policies toward these questions may only be short-run palliatives. But in a changing world the Japanese cannot honestly be faulted for this. They certainly have not let a false sense of complacency surround them, but instead have a sense of uneasiness as they look to the future. They will certainly examine all options rigorously.

As viewed from an economic perspective, economic because any option taken or accepted by the Japanese will have economic as well as military consequences, there are four basic options open to the Japanese under two general and opposing assumptions of world order. One assumption is a world order in which the nation-states are in competition for diminishing resources and the level of competition is escalated as resource scarcity increases. The other assumption is that the world order will become more cooperative in nature, sharing access to the limited resources on an equitable basis. Operating within this framework, there are four alternatives for Japan to be analyzed.<sup>19</sup> These alternatives are not mutually exclusive, but are, to some degree, interdependent, overlapping and reciprocal in nature, with no sharp distinction between them.

### Option One: Maintaining the Status Quo

This option is characteristic of past Japanese political approaches. Letting the inertia of the status quo dictate the choice. This option also relies entirely on an "iron clad" alliance system, a system that would demand a certain amount of accommodation on Japan's part. One major obstacle to this approach is acquiring an ally willing to jeopardize its own national interests and survival for the status quo and security of Japan.

Non-action on Japan's part has great appeal for the Japanese because it is an evasive option. They see their alternatives sharply constricted by their fragile vulnerabilities and humiliating reliance on international goodwill and cooperation. However, the age of anonymity is gone for the Japanese. They cannot risk the survival of their nation and their accustomed high living standard to the interests and capricious actions of aliens.

### Option Two: Self-Sufficiency through Cooperation

A major portion of the world leaders have spoken out in favor of a worldwide cooperative effort to share access to scarce raw materials. However, these same leaders have maintained that they will not permit their nations to be held hostage by foreign powers for want of a strategic commodity. This modified policy of self-sufficiency means that any nation adhering to it must

be flexible and allow for possible shifts in the world order. Japan cannot afford this luxury. Japan cannot be isolationist for much more than 100 days.<sup>20</sup> There is little within the country which might sustain it. This option does not seem viable for an extended period of time.

### Option Three: Import/Export Cooperation

Japan has long been an advocate of, but not a subscriber to, free trade. Their philosophy, like that of other developed nations, has been to maximize gains from the export of manufactured products while simultaneously placing protectionist impediments on manufactured imports which might be injurious to their economic development. Their rationale for these actions was both nationalistic and protectionist in nature. But no matter what label was given to the policy, the fact remained that the Japanese were not going to let foreign investments in Japan weaken their control over their own economic destiny. The validity of this argument became more difficult for Japan's competitors to accept as Japan's economy developed into the world's leading economy.

As the worldwide concern for scarce resources culminates, Japan will perceive a new world economic role for itself. The realization that its greatest and most vulnerable weakness is not foreign control of its economy

but its reliance on a reliable flow of commercial and industrial raw materials will lead to Japan's advocacy of more equitable two-way free trade.

This option requires increasing amounts of cooperation worldwide and has long-term consequences for Japan's economy. Essentials in this paragonic option are freedom for peaceful and equitable transactions without the obstructions of regionalism or hegemonic self-interests. For Japan this could equally mean a real threat of foreign control for its economy.

Global interests of the various nations on this planet make the prospects for such a utopian option extremely poor. U. S.-Japanese cooperation can be assumed for the near future, but Japanese-European cooperation is another matter. There are dangerously competitive relations between the economies of Western Europe and Japan. Each views the other as a threat. The result is an atmosphere less than conducive to generating any real cooperation over access to strategic and scarce resources. This situation leaves only one remaining option to be explored.

#### Option Four: Remilitarization of Japan

Japan could be confronted with eventual resource problems that are analogous to the pre-war adversities it faced and could once again consider the alternatives of rearmament followed by territorial expansion as a

means of security for the desired control of essential raw materials. This action could, but would not have to be, accompanied by a renewed right wing, ultra-nationalistic militarism. A decade ago someone with this same idea would have been labeled unrealistic but today many of the arguments that were used to invalidate this theory are slowly disappearing:

The memories of Japan's stinging defeat are still vivid. This argument dominates much of the literature, past and present, often ignoring the facts of Japanese history and the present world situation. Japanese history demonstrates that Japan has been willing to resort to military action as a means of solving international disputes in the past. As a national policy of the past this is not easily overlooked.<sup>21</sup> More recent international events have also faded the so-called psychological aversion to the use of military force. These events, spanning a time frame from the Korean War and including the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have incontrovertibly eroded the memories of Japan's defeat at the hands of its present ally, the United States.

The strength of the pacifist in the LDP is too strong. With 30% of the Russian military forces stationed in the Far East and more than 11,000 Soviet troops in the Northern Territories,<sup>22</sup> the last thing anyone should be

concerned with is strong pacifism in the Japanese body politic. Just the opposite is true; concern should be focused on the changes in military attitude taking place in the Japanese government that are guiding Japan toward a new role of leadership in East Asia - not solely based on economic power.

In the past there has been a public reluctance to the discussion of military matters, but recent indications of a change in the public attitude is apparent. Japanese officials now openly discuss such matters and even refer to the Self-Defense force as separate branches, Army, Navy and Air Force. Other indications of a strong right wing element in the government are discussions of doubling the defense budget on the Diet floor, along with the building of an ASW fleet of aircraft carriers and nuclear weapons development. It is public discussions of this type that less than two years ago were responsible for the then Chief of Staff, General Hiroomi Kurisu, being released from active service.<sup>23</sup>

The reaction to Japanese rearmament would probably be negative from its Asian neighbors and the global community. This argument is often used against remilitarization of Japan. The American collective security system desires a Japan more capable of autonomous defense. This would assist the "system" in coping with expanded

Soviet military power in the region and possibly alleviate the requirement for a "swing strategy" - a strategy that neither Japan nor NATO Europe have much faith in for the obvious reason that the Seventh Fleet offers little more than power projection, has limited strategic value and during a conflict could easily be incapacitated in transit from the Pacific Basin to the European theater.

Chinese leaders have also expressed their concern in regards to Japanese rearmament. In fact, the Chinese have made a startling attitude transformation toward Japan's approach to rearmament.<sup>24</sup> China's political-military environment has shown growing support for an enlarged Japanese defense base and effort. This change in attitude, on China's part, could be related to Peking's desire to acquire Japanese weapons and defense related technology.

Many of the Asian leaders have begun to speak out on Japan's changing military position in Asia. Some have expressed "no alarm" concerning Japan's new posture, with the qualifier that it remain conventional. Perhaps the most significant comment made to date was first expressed publicly by China's Vice Chairman Teng Hsiao-ping (Deng Xiao-ping) in September 1978. Speaking to a Japanese delegation in Peking, Teng said, "I am in favor of Japan's self-defense force build-up." Other Asian

leaders have also publicly endorsed Japan's recent Defense White Paper (1979), which clearly perceives the Soviet Union as a direct threat to Japan and its Asian neighbors.

The price for this unreserved oratory in the Pacific Asian community has been high. Backfire bombers are now stationed in Kamchatka, there are new Soviet bases on the Kuril Islands and Bear reconnaissance aircraft are now based out of Danang and the former U. S. naval base at Cam Ranh Bay. The signing of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty in August 1978 also had its associated and resultant effects. This action may have prompted Moscow to sign the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Vietnam only three months after the signing of the Sino-Japanese treaty.

Obviously there have been substantial changes in the international environment since the early 1950's when Japan started its initial rearmament effort. Japan's defense expenditures have fluctuated from near 3% of GNP to as low as .77% of GNP during this period,<sup>25</sup> conceivably this could be a barometric indication of past world political stability and could perhaps forecast or indicate future world political and economic doubts. Are Japan's current military expenditures anticipatory in nature and an indication of another Korean or Vietnam conflict? What will the implications be for Japan during this current period of increased arms production and procurement?



### III. INDEFINITE FUTURE: CONTINUED DEPENDENCE

"A community of the developed nations must eventually be formed if the world is to respond effectively to the increasingly serious crisis that in different ways now threatens both the advanced world and the Third World."

Zbigniew Brzezinski  
Between Two Ages

What Mr. Brzezinski refers to as a "serious crisis" is the increasing division between the "haves" and the "have nots" on a global stratum. This is a serious crisis and one that effects Japan as well as other advanced nations in this approaching post-industrial world.

Japan and these other technologically advanced societies are confronted with a multitude of interrelated dilemmas - control of technology, work roles, growth and distribution of wealth. These dilemmas have interrelationships on two levels - national and international. This interrelationship or interdependency among societies and nations is a factor influential in the present structure of the world order.

Therefore Japan's existence for an indefinite time will depend on its western ally and the rate at which Japan decides to move toward a greater independent role in the world.

Many authors perceive a need for a structural alteration of the present international economic order.<sup>26</sup> These writers advocate a new order that would redistribute the

wealth between rich and poor countries and also between the poor and privileged segments of the Third World. Many of these "authorities" have limited perceptions - or perceptions based on their positions - where you sit determines where you stand - many even have tunnel vision when they discuss the topic of world order. They limit their discussion and perceptions to the rich and the poor, the developed and the developing. Their all-encompassing locution, including terms such as "Third World," is only appropriate as a description of countries that have vast amounts of resource wealth but lack development or industrialization. But because of events that lead to the formation of OPEC and similar regions there is a need to recognize a "Fourth World" in the existing world order. This is a portion of the world that is devoid of natural resources and with exiguous prospects for increased future development, the resource poor, but industrialized nations.

How does all this relate to Japanese rearmament and the implications associated with this effort? Japan, although not yet part of the "Fourth World" could, at some time in the near future, be confronted with a number of the problems associated with "Fourth World" nations today: problems relating to resource transfers.

Japan's status - economically, politically and militarily - in the present structure of the world order is dependent entirely on the cooperation and goodwill of other nations.

Although this condition is often pointed out as being unique to the Japanese, it is to some degree a condition that all industrial nations must cope with. Even so, the fact remains that Japan is almost totally dependent on foreign sources for raw materials, natural resources and its national security.

In this chapter the focus will be on the variables and indicators associated with Japan's dependency role in the present world order. Two general areas related to Japan's perceived need to rearm will be discussed and analyzed: resources - in relationship to Japan's needs, accessibility, control and the security of these resources that are necessary in order for Japan to maintain its present position in the world order; and secondly, domestic rearmament efforts to secure Japan's role as a dependent nation. These factors control the implications for Japan's indefinite future.

#### A. RESOURCES

Resource scarcity is a "front page" topic in most publication, public and private, today. With the extreme emphasis placed on the subject and its strategic value to national security interests, it would be difficult to avoid its discussion in any analysis of a topic even remotely related to economics and especially related to Japan. Japan's scarcity of indigenous natural resources is

well known throughout the industrial world. In any discussion of Japan's economy, it is a factor that is always mentioned. The islands of Japan are deficient in almost every raw material normally associated with the creation and continued successful operation of an industrial economy.<sup>27</sup> With these facts in mind, how has Japan managed its industrialization?

Since the time of the Meiji Restoration, Japan's goal has been to "catch up with the West." Following World War II, this goal was achieved by purchasing natural resources on the world spot market, which helped maximize the gross national product of Japan. But there have been difficulties recently, both externally and internally, associated with this approach. Externally, Japan has become extremely dependent on other countries for resources and is subject to external shocks like the oil crisis or the soybean embargo. Japan is also confronted with other difficult external factors or situations. The fact that resources can be nationalized abroad almost overnight is quite real and this is associated with another realism of worldwide commodity shortages - physical or politically motivated. Even Japan's grand strategy of resource diversification cannot provide the necessary security as Japan continues to increase its already large share of world raw material imports.<sup>28</sup> Internally, there are no good

reasons for the continued pursuit of this policy of the past. Japan has compromised much of its culture and sacrificed quality of life in order to pursue the goals set by the West. Economic growth has done much for Japan but the price in national and individual identity has been high.

This Japanese approach to resource scarcity following World War II - relying on the social institutions of international commerce and abandonment of pre-war goals of military control to assure access to raw materials - was accomplished through assurances made by the trading world to supply Japan's commercial needs for raw materials. The 1979 Defense White Paper implies that Japan's faith in the continued success of this international policy has deteriorated. This is reflected in the passage "...deep-rooted confrontation and distrust continue among the nations of the world, creating confrontations and disputes among them...creating instability in international society. In the midst of such an international environment, the security of nations must be maintained by comprehensive military, political, economic and diplomatic policies."<sup>29</sup>

The options available in the expanse of resource accessibility are not relished by Japan's political and military leadership. When a resource-poor, developed country confronts a world of politically motivated scarcity, the reality of their situation becomes vivid. They could

accept the situation and promote economic stagnation or even economic decline. In this case, Japan would then require fewer imports of raw materials and could concentrate on reasserting its own true culture, which is different from the West. If this option were rejected, then Japan must face the reality of obtaining access to raw materials from other countries by strengthening and exercising its geo-political and military powers, an option similar to the one followed in the 1930s.

With the uncertainty associated with the present international policies of resource accessibility and its global implications, Japan will at some future date be coerced into accepting either stagnated economic consequences or geo-political, military expansionist policies. A stagnated economy would not be a joyous option for Japan. It would cause widespread societal strife within the nation. Externally the whole world would feel the effects of a no-growth Japanese economy. This possibility is real to the Japanese, and has caused long-run concern and pessimism within Japan.

In sum, today Japan is confronted with confinement to a limited space, and a pressing population far greater than the pre-war period. A substantial portion of its food and raw materials must be imported and the possibility of interdiction either in transporting these essentials or in accessibility to them is quite graphic. Japan's present

approach to its natural resource deficiency may, in the future, prove ineffectual in a world faced with severe politically-motivated resource shortages. Japan's perception of world resource scarcity will be a determinant or an indicator of the degree to which policy changes will occur, but the change will be toward some increased measure of economic and military self-sufficiency. This degree of change will be limited by and linked to Japan's military and diplomatic strength and their position in the new world order.

#### B. DOMESTIC REARMAMENT

It is clear that a no-growth Japanese economy is unacceptable to both the Japanese and their trading partners - the remainder of the world. Therefore, some consideration should be accorded to the possibility of an effort by Japan to enhance its present self-defense forces, thus providing itself with a stronger geo-political capability of securing its future and contributing to continued economic growth.

A reference of 1978 is a significant starting point because one could ascertain a new, bolder direction in Japan's foreign policy. 1978 was the year that Japan signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the People's Republic of China and the year that the Japanese first publicly acknowledged the Soviet Union as a threat to Asia in their 1978 Defense White Paper. 1978 was also the year

that the Foreign Minister of Japan stated in an interview that ". . . I shall never tire of my search for peace, nor give up my feeling that war must be prevented at all cost, by whatever means."<sup>30</sup>

This statement by Sunao Sonoda would have been politically acceptable twelve months earlier, but in 1978 with a decline in the left wing of the Liberal Democratic Party and a regression of the pacifist movement nationally it was political hara-kiri. It was just at this time in Japan that political and public attitude changes toward defense and increasing the national military capability took place.

It was this modification in attitude and the broadened base of support for both the Self-Defense Force and the U. S. forces in Japan that lead to the conclusion of a government-to-government agreement between the United States and Japan for joint arms development and transfer.<sup>31</sup>

This agreement has two extremely important implications for Japan. First, it breaks the governmental export barrier that once surrounded Japanese defense industries.<sup>32</sup> Even though the transfers to the United States will be Japanese electronic technology to U. S. firms, the fact still remains that it is in direct conflict to a governmental policy which bans the exportation of military hardware or software. It is apparent that the Defense Industry Committee of the Federation of Economic Organizations



of Japan has persuaded the Japanese government that their policy must be overlooked if Japan is going to pursue a course of defense modernization. At the present time this cooperation between the two countries will be related to such weapons as cruise missiles and precision-guided missiles. But in the future this agreement, which has set a precedent, will be the guide for increased military cooperation throughout Asia. Japan could attain the role of a regional arms exporter that would rival that of France, while simultaneously reducing the indigenous cost associated with rearming so that the analogy - Switzerland of Asia - would be more accurate than ever.<sup>33</sup>

Precision-guided munitions/missiles (PGMs) add a very interesting aspect or implication to this agreement between Japan and the United States. When advanced weaponry is the topic there are numerous questions that arise concerning ability of the nation in question to absorb the weapons, added stability or instability the weapons bring to the region of introduction and a question of defensive or offensive nature of the PGMs. These questions are serious and will be briefly addressed here.

An industrial advanced nation (Japan) will consider the purchase of PGMs for various reasons: a perceived threat of external forces, the relationship between cost and ability to pay, and the ability of a skilled military force to absorb the sophisticated PGMs.

These conclusions can be made. There is a relationship between stability and PGMs. They (PGMs) accelerate rather than change the basic trends in conventional warfare. These new, sophisticated PGMs will consume manpower and hardware at a rate relative to their sophistication. This will mean that if a country possesses these weapons and understands the tactical nature of the weapon (which his adversary may also possess) it will be necessary to have a large force or one that is mobilized easily prior to and during any conflict engagement. Engaging in a conflict that consumes men and material at a rapid rate will require a support system of equal sophistication. Therefore, the country in question must have highly skilled manpower, not only to operate the equipment, but also to maintain it and have an understanding of the logistics necessary in the event a conflict occurs. This is an accurate description of the Japanese infrastructure.

There are some false assumptions associated with PGMs. One that is important here is: they reduce the cost of conflict engagement because they operate on a "one shot, one kill" theory. As the system was described above, it is evident that all this could actually increase the total cost of force maintenance rather than reduce it, dependent on the force structure and size.

Another false assumption is that PGMs are basically a defensive weapon and a stabilizing force. It could be said that the best defense is a good offense, but this type of weapon can be used in more than one role (like most weapons invented by man) and threaten rear areas. This threat when perceived by the adversary will increase the risk of pre-emptive attack. But before the aggressor decides to attack he must be willing to pay the consequences, for a conflict involving PGMs (conventional) will be extremely expensive in terms of equipment and men. Therefore, these weapons could reduce the small-scale "brushfire" type of aggression - if both sides were armed with these weapons. The point here is that since these weapons are relatively inexpensive to purchase (produce) and they improve one's defensive (offensive) capabilities greatly, they could be a deterrence to some nation's historically aggressive hegemonic nature in a specific region. It is believed that Japan is possibly pursuing this capability of increased effectiveness offered by PGMs to reduce the need for nuclear proliferation in Asia. This theory has prevailed in Japan for thirty years (by no means a conclusive timeframe in a historical sense). It is still difficult to determine if PGMs will be/are stabilizing or not. The consequence for stability will be linked to the total levels and distribution of weapons in a region and not to the acquisition of PGMs.<sup>34</sup>

The cost of rearming is the factor that has slowed the cautious progress of the Japanese government. It is also the barrier that is now eroding. Prime Minister Ohira has stated that there is a need for increased defense spending, but that because of political (and economic) realities a large-scale build-up would be difficult to achieve.<sup>35</sup>

This has not diminished a sense of anticipation among the business leaders of Japan's defense-related industries.<sup>36</sup> They sense an opportunity for large profits because defense spending is not subject to the same economic cycles that affect the other sectors of Japan's declining economy. With high profit margins offered by any defense related industry and the relatively few firms associated with this industry, there are enormous profits to be made by these firms in a time when the world is experiencing international instability, resource scarcity and declining economic growth.

#### C. THE FRENCH CONNECTION

With these three factors (international instability, resource scarcity, and declining economic growth) in mind, it is relatively simple to construct a model of Japan as a regional arms exporter. Variables affecting this model are continued growth, technological development, balance of payments for equilibrium, access to raw materials, and the

desire for high employment. The model is based on the French arms industry and its governmental support, as is evident in a brief reference to pertinent factors that follow.

Since the end of World War II, the French government has desired to achieve the aforementioned variables. Their industrial expansion was fueled by under-utilized agricultural labor. In the 1960s France had the highest growth rate in Western Europe. In 1973 the Arab oil embargo was a hindrance to France's economic momentum. At this point in history, arms sales (foreign military sales - FMS) and the associated industry assumed a position of importance in France. France's weak competitive position, worsening trade posture, lower economic growth, inflation and high unemployment, and an energy deficit of 60 billion francs (1976) all contributed to the importance placed on arms sales as a high foreign exchange earner.

In order to halt this declining economy and internal instability, the French government took steps to restructure French foreign commerce in the areas of capital goods and in securing new trade partners in the Third World. These areas are where arms sales have played important roles. Application of this policy achieved good results between 1974 and 1976. The "real value" to French productivity (business affairs and exports) has grown. France's balance of payments and commercial position now

depend on arms sales. The initial justification for this dependent nature was: with increased arms research and development and "tooling up" costs are reduced by the larger volume of production. Also FMS were used to support technology advancements and support independent military and diplomatic policies. This independent and autonomous weapons production capacity achieved the leverage France desired in bargaining with the superpowers. It was also a commitment to self-determination, a linkage between the welfare and security functions of government and a mechanism of modernization.<sup>37</sup>

This model is highly realistic if one considers the role Japan perceives for itself in the next two to three decades. The Japanese appreciate the fact that in the present world order there is no single overwhelming power capable of dominating global events and reorganizing the world order as the United States did at the end of World War II. Therefore, the approach they perceive as being operationalized by any dominant powers is one of regionalism. Therefore it is inconceivable to the Japanese that ASEAN and China could develop without cooperative relations with Japan. The Japanese, through their economic-industrial sector, may achieve the dominance they desired forty years earlier.

The next step for Japan in this role as a larger regional military force is to provide for the security of its charges. Through an arms sales program, Japan could not only contribute to its increasing independent military defense effort, but an arms sales program to ASEAN and China would serve as a tool in the Japanese regional strategy of governmental centrism for Third World nations of Asia. This would not only reduce the dependency of these nations on the superpowers but would also contribute to the greater implementation of Japan's multi-directional diplomacy.<sup>38</sup>

One of the flaws a critic of this model may point out is that the arms market is already dominated by highly industrialized nations that have a large share of the market. Since competition in foreign markets has not been a factor to the Japanese in the past and with their technical expertise and established reputation for high quality equipment, such as automobiles and electronics, a foothold has already been established and military sales could be integrated easily. The benefits for Japan are obvious: arms exports would assure full employment and the profitability of numerous undertakings and permit them to lengthen the production series and thereby lower the unit cost of arms manufactured, facilitating the equipment of their own armed forces at lesser expense.<sup>39</sup> The economy of Japan's defense industry today - an industry and weapons

modernization program that is impeded by governmental policy requiring indigenous production of 80% of all military hardware<sup>40</sup> - would have greater allowances for capacity expansion, providing an expanded production base that would be tailored to coping with crisis and increased threat perception. The small production base now could be expanded easily by increasing the military weapons and technology trade between China, ASEAN and Japan.

Another factor closely related to Japanese economics and security is the search for energy and the necessity for strategic resources. Since the Japanese are for the first time in their recent history experiencing a trade deficit with the oil-rich O.P.E.C. nations, a model for their "new" trading relations would be simple to construct. The Japanese could justify an arms sales agreement with either China or the oil-rich O.P.E.C. countries a number of different ways. It has been stated that there is a need to achieve balance in the Japanese-O.P.E.C. trade relationship. For the quantities of oil that Japan desires, it could offer reliable military equipment sophisticated enough to attract the Arab world, yet simple enough that it would not require extended or intensive training by the Japanese to operate. This sector of the arms market is relatively untouched and would be a novelty. The major arms producers in the world, the U. S., U.S.S.R.,



Great Britain and France, are quite apt at supplying highly sophisticated military hardware, but this requires intensive in-country training by advisors to become operational. The Japanese, in supplying equipment that just meets and does not exceed the needs of the recipient nation, would be gaining the raw resources they need in exchange for a relatively small quantity of arms that are a highly valuable commodity.

In Asia, Japan's argument for supplying arms would be similar, but would have more altruistic connotations. The Japanese have realized for decades the possibilities and benefits of economic cooperation in Asia. The record of the developing countries in Asia is extraordinary. Even after the oil embargo of 1973, most have been able to maintain annual growth rates between 5 and 8 percent a year, in spite of a growing global recession.<sup>41</sup> They (the Japanese) also have a need for more export fields now that they are encountering increased barriers in the United States and Europe. Therefore, a Japan professing an "Asia for Asians" and offering economical and military assistance could sell this argument as providing the Third World nations of Asia with the means of protecting their abundance of natural resources and their independence from the dominating superpowers.

In sum, the Japanese industrial machine, Japan Inc., is facing fierce competition in the traditional fields of manufactured goods from some Asian competitors and is hindered by nationalistic barriers rising in the West and Europe. These factors are aggravated by rising inflation, low economic growth and increasing social pressures at home. There are new demands being heard that call for a new era in which Japan must secure and invest in markets abroad while developing its own technologies instead of copying the West's.

Japan, while showing impressive technological innovation and a high degree of automation in present industries, has also created unemployment and discontent within the existing system. Productivity in many of the highly automated industries has fallen far below capacity. Yet wage demands peak at about 9% per year while economic growth stagnates near 4%. Consumer prices increase annually at 8% and the driving force behind it all is a wholesale price rise of 21%. All these factors are accentuated by the closure of 5.4 million small businesses, a major portion of the Japanese industrial network.<sup>42</sup>

Currently Japan confronts a variety of domestic and international uncertainties. It is not known how long Japan will be able to continue its policy of decoupling economic policies and relationships from political and

military ones. Does the 1980 defense budget reflect a coupling of policies in Japan? Will a growing defense industry be a panacea or a provocation for Japan's economic woes?

#### D. JAPAN'S DEFENSE BUDGET

In the past seven years Japanese defense expenditures, while remaining at a relatively stable 0.90 percent of Japan's gross national product, have increased from \$3.9 billion in 1974 to \$9.7 billion in 1980.<sup>43</sup> While the purpose of this analysis is not to examine the Japanese defense budget, it will provide some insight into Japanese efforts to augment its defense structure.

The 1980 Japanese defense budget, like all previous defense budgets, does not include military pensions and certain other costs associated with a typical Western defense budget. If these associated costs were included in Japan's military budget, the figure would be near 1.5% of their gross national product.

Nearly 50% of the current Japanese military budget is allocated for personnel cost. This allocation is for a force of only about 240,000 men. This computes to be over \$19,000 per man to maintain a force that because of its size reflects Japan's emphasis on a quality force.

The remainder of the budget is divided into procurement and operations of the SDF and research and development cost. Among the three branches of the SDF, the ground force receives the largest portion, while the navy and air force are evenly split. What is significant about the Japanese military budget is not what is included, but what is excluded from it.

One of the exclusions is Japan's national space development program. Much of the research and expense of this program is absorbed by Tokyo University's Institute of Space and Aeronautical Sciences. Their most recent project has been the testing of a launch vehicle with a three-stage solid-fuel motor system. This system is officially being tested for scientific observations at altitudes between 134-217 miles. This launch vehicle can carry a payload of over 400 pounds and would appear to have military role capabilities. These Japanese space development and launch vehicle programs amount to about \$1 billion per year and the current programs are forecasted to last 15 years.<sup>44</sup> These programs could provide Japan with an ABM (anti-ballistic missile) capability prior to 1990.

Another factor associated with this unique budgetary system the Japanese have is the field of nuclear research. Currently the Japanese are developing nuclear technology in all the major processes inherent to the production of

nuclear fuel-mining and milling, refining, enrichment, fabrication, power reactor use and construction, reprocessing and disposal. The costs associated with this research and development and technology have all been absorbed by civilian programs.

What is even more interesting is the fact that Japan has almost no indigenous sources of uranium. But the Japanese continue to develop their nuclear programs. This action has required Japan to actively engage in a program of developing uranium resources overseas. Since the mid-1960s Japan has conducted resource development in South Australia, Somalia, Thailand, Malaysia and various countries in Central and South America.<sup>45</sup> It is doubtful that Japan will allow itself to be held hostage by the uranium rich countries if a major portion of Japan's power needs are supplied by the increasing number of electricity generating plants powered by nuclear reactors.<sup>46</sup>

#### E. SUMMATION

This chapter may have raised more questions concerning Japanese efforts to secure strategic resources and its domestic rearmament efforts than it answered. But this does not minimize its importance since these questions are associated with the analysis of Japan's current trends and actions regarding resources and security.

It can be concluded that Japan is emphasizing a military capability significantly greater than just a few years ago. Whether this new security stance is more the result of a Soviet Pacific forces build-up, decreased American world status, or a Japanese fear of economic collapse is not clear. History may prove that each of these factors with their associated linkages is part of a force behind Japan's efforts toward independence and rearmament.

As salient as these factors may appear, they are not cause enough for Japan to pursue a totally independent course, politically or militarily, disassociated from the United States. There will be no radical departure from its present security dependence on the United States, nor will Japan divorce itself from the enormously valuable markets and resources provided by the interdependence it enjoys with the Western world.

There will be increased political, economic and military association and interaction with the nations of Asia. This region has the capability of becoming the world's most dynamic, economically, in the future. There will be dramatic changes in relationships within the region. Both ASEAN and Japan realize the inter-dependence and reliance they share. They also seek a cooperative effort in the new Asian market of China. There is ample opportunity for foreign investment in this region and the only thing that

will upset it is political instability. But the importance of Japan's role in Asia only serves to underscore the importance Japan places on its relationship with the U. S.

It is unlikely that Japan will continue to be as subordinate a partner as it currently appears to be in the Pacific security sphere of the United States. Any and all moves by Japan toward indigenous security (resource or military) will tend to reduce the degree of domination by its Western ally. If Japan desires this increased autonomy and in the process is willing to forego the expense, both political and economic, in order to achieve this degree of autonomy, then a strategic question which still remains unanswered for Japan and the world is: will Japan be able to achieve the degree of autonomy it desires without igniting the volatile environment that surrounds and focuses on Japan?

#### IV. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF AUTONOMY

"If all else fails, military power will prevail"

Japan is the only nation in the Asian region, ignoring the potential of China, that through its indigenous production is capable of developing an armed force exceeding its current level. Japan, being a modern industrial nation and security-conscious, produces approximately 98% of its munitions and 85% of the materiel needs of the SDF.<sup>47</sup> Japan's population of over 112 million provides the potential for a mass citizenry force. Moreover, its nuclear technology and delivery system expertise enables Japan to step into the nuclear weapons arena almost immediately, if they haven't already done so.

There are geopolitical and economic interests of three great powers in this region, interests that focus on Japan and rival each other for a position of predominance. Japan's role has been and will continue to be a pivotal role in the triangular relationships in this region. This delicate role that Japan plays between China, Russia and the United States could be altered by any change in Japan's defense posture. Japan's analogous role as the Switzerland of Asia appears to be soon a self-fulfilling prophecy and the political leadership of Japan appears to be making gestures that may upset this delicate balance.<sup>48</sup> It is



now up to each actor in this precision mutuality, known as world order, to define the options available to it and take appropriate and immediate action to assure peace and prosperity throughout the region in light of recent military and diplomatic developments.

This chapter will highlight a variety of the options and appropriate actions available to these international actors if Japan's gestures are indeed moves toward a more autonomous defense and foreign policy program. In other words, what are the strategic implications for China, Russia and the United States in relation to a rearmed Japan? But prior to attempting to address this question, it would be beneficial to address the question of each nation's own national interests in this region and the concept of national interest as it relates to this work.

#### A. THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL INTEREST

The nation-state, although diverse in nature, tries to provide the other world actors with a single image of its national interests, even though these interests are kaleidoscopic. This should not come as a surprise to either the adversaries or the allies of the nation-state since their interests in the world are also kaleidoscopic or multifaceted in nature.

The concept of national interest is of central importance to sovereign states. It is through this key concept that the national actors relate to the world actors the objectives of the nation-state in the international organization.

The nation-state is a complex set of bureaucratic institutions and roles where the term "national interest" has context. Americans tend to think of their national government as a large blundering bureaucratic mass incapable of sustained action unless it is faced with an internal and/or external crisis. In the non-crisis environment, decision-making seems to be derived by conflicting interest within the bureaucracy extending from the society through the ostensibly hierarchically ordered central bureaucracy of the state.<sup>49</sup>

Societal pressures determine the behavior of the state's government through the political process of their respective systems, but the national interests of that state (pre-eminently the United States) are dictated to the international actors by the political head of state and his foreign affairs/national security advisors.

This can be illustrated by briefly reviewing the major political events affecting the Pacific Basin in the past decade, listed at the beginning of Chapter II. These political events, some influenced by the United States and others totally void of U. S. involvement, have reshaped the domestic

attitudes of the nations involved and have emotionally damaged the United States' political leadership. But in a basically bipolar world, the influence a major actor has could be deficient although involvement should never be a deficiency in the arena where major political events reshape world order. The American public echoes "no more Vietnam" and their leaders conclude that America can no longer be the "world's policeman." This is closely followed by an essentially reactive, noninvolvement outlook on world affairs. The emotional wounds that have been inflicted on the American leaders will heal, albeit the scars may remain for an indefinite period.

In the Pacific Basin these scars have become visible to the political leaders of Japan, despite the present administration's continued reassurances to the contrary. There remains a margin of doubt in the Asian minds as to America's resolve to act in accordance with their perception of United States treaty commitments. Not only do Asians sense a "failure of will" on America's part, but other allies also express similar doubts. These doubts are underscored by the fact that the Soviet Union is now involved in the greatest military buildup in all history; that they now have transformed a once-defensive coastal naval force into a power-projecting blue water navy capable of extending power

anywhere in the world; and that through their military buildup they are achieving the major political and diplomatic goals of the Soviet Union.

Japan's political leaders also sense a U. S. preoccupation with domestic problems which have linkages to the Middle East and Europe. At the same time, Japanese leaders express interest and desire for continued American presence in their region. It therefore becomes essential to America and its allies in the Pacific Basin that they define their regional national interest in terms that clarify the complexity and kaleidoscopic nature of American foreign policy.

#### B. PACIFIC BASIN INTEREST

Japanese societal pressures determine the behavior of the national government. The foreign policy of the state is only one interest among many and the Japanese reject the notion of a national interest that is not a product of the combined efforts of pluralistic societal goals. It is their contention that the concept of national interest has no meaning except as a summation of pluralistic preferences.

The two major actors that are adjacent to Japan in Asia (PRC and USSR) may have another concept of national interest that is also valid. Their national interests can be summated by a consistent set of objectives sought by

central actors of government at the decision-making level. These objectives could be the acquisition of influence and use of power on an international and regional level.

Soviet interests in Asia have been expressed openly since about 1963 when the ideological split with China manifested and the Soviets began to increase their affirmation as an Asian power. Soviet interest in Asia, in relationship to Japan, since that time has also been well defined.

A Soviet presence in Asia prior to April 30, 1975 could be summarized as cautious probing with the Soviet bayonet. Their interests were directly linked to their defensive posture on the Sino-Soviet border and amassing military defensive forces in the Asian region that connoted Moscow's approach to foreign policy - if all else fails, military power will prevail. During this period the Soviet bayonet would meet resistance and withdraw at irregular intervals. Today the Soviets' steely bayonet is finely honed and meets little if any resistance in this region. Their interests are now related to the massing of military forces but not only to ensure their hard-nose, uncompromising stands, but also to bring pressure on the regional actors to acquiesce to Soviet strategic views of world order, a view that employs military power to guarantee its security and position.

The Soviets have three goals that are reflected by their actions in the Pacific Basin. First, they have strategic goals. Faced with an American-Japanese military alliance that is posed at their eastern front, they attempt to loosen the bonds between the signators of this alliance. Attempts to affect this alliance must also be accompanied by an attempt to discourage Tokyo from major rearmament, while simultaneously preventing Sino-Japanese rapprochement.

The second goal is economic. Japan is totally dependent upon external sources of raw materials and energy. The Soviets, noting this dependency and the vast industrial and technological base Japan would provide for an undeveloped Siberia, strive for a Japan that is economically, as well as politically, linked to Russia.

The third goal is political. While the parties of this bipolar world compete for Japanese allegiance, the Japanese are assessing the options: go nuclear or vastly increase her conventional forces. Japan is likely to act as a free agent for an indefinite period until its vital national interests are threatened to such a degree that Japan is left with no choice but to defend itself with all available means and alliance commitments.

There are serious obstacles that impede any major improvements in Soviet-Japanese relations. The Soviet "heavy hand" nature in diplomacy and law of the sea issues

in dispute have not helped their image in Japan. The Soviet Union consistently scores lowest in public opinion polls in Japan, reflecting Japanese perceptions of Russian intentions in the Pacific Basin.

Today Chinese interests outside of the Pacific Basin are of little concern to the other global actors, save their potential as an economic and military force to be contended with at some distant future date. Albeit China possesses a nuclear capability and could be envisioned as one of the five major world actors, it does not have the ability to project its influence beyond the boundaries of Asia. This perception of weakness is recognized by the other major powers and is capitalized on by the Soviet Union.

Soviet rhetoric from the Kremlin repeatedly stresses the present Chinese inferior military and economic capabilities in relation to the U.S.S.R. China's recent programs to counter this perception of impotency has led to serious questions being raised within the party apparatus as to the perversity of its ideological commitment. This fact was underscored by the purge of six Politburo members lead by Wang Dong-xing, who opposed Deng Xiao-ping's efforts of reform, and the re-emergence/promotion of Chen Yun, the leader of China's post-1949 economic recovery.<sup>50</sup> These actions were followed by a reassessment of the proposed modernization programs in light of the capital requirement and outlays.

The leadership of China desires to present a unified front against its primary security threat and major competitor for influence in this region. Therefore, the Chinese will continue to try to align themselves with any anti-Soviet scheme, especially those sustained by nations that China could elicit economic and military assistance from. At the present time this tactic is accented by a large portion of Chinese foreign policy rhetoric.

Chinese perceptions of Soviet intentions in the Pacific Basin contributed to the confrontation between the regime of Vietnam and the Peoples Liberation Army. By sustaining Vietnam, Chinese leaders appraised that Moscow had rearranged the Pacific Basin power structure. This realpolitik was unacceptable to Chinese leaders on two counts: China could not accept Vietnam's "brazen interference" in Cambodia and they could not accept without challenge the continuation of a well-equipped power basking in the alliance of Moscow and eliminating China's geographical advantage of contending with the presence of Russia on only one border.

The mutuality of interests between China and Japan have been enhanced, on all levels, by the dynamics of world affairs and Soviet intervention in Asia. Although the ideologies of these two actors differ, their cultural bonds are firm. This factor is sustained by a Japanese approach to business that separates it from the political constraints often placed on economic issues by some Western powers.



Interest in Western (read Japanese) technology for the progress of China's modernization program is of great importance to Chinese leadership. Japan's role in this development seems to be critically important, since the United States' approach to providing China with technology is likely to be similar to its past approach when dealing with other developing countries - piece-meal in nature and often inappropriate for the cultural context of the country.

An exchange of Chinese raw materials for Japanese technology will likely be the terms of trade and will benefit both countries. Another benefit that can be realized by both countries is an alliance that will provide China with the modern military materiel it requires and in turn providing Japan with an opportunity for a more creditable nuclear deterrence that has proven its will to act within the region.

The Confucian culture that embraces both China and Japan is embroiled with a myriad of devices to "save face" whenever possible. They believe that if one is perceived as weak, then he is weak, and it is only a matter of time before the United States will be perceived as weak if it continues to follow its present course of ineptness in the Asian region.

When the concept of national interest is put in the context of American policy in the Pacific Basin, a clear ranking of goals is suggested:

- 1) preserve sufficient economic, political and military strength to guarantee the security of American vital interests in the region;
- 2) maintain its strategic presence in Asia;
- 3) maintain its alliance with Japan;
- 4) preserve and extend our economic relations;
- 5) solve problems of economic and political competition to the mutual benefit of all.

These goals reflect the national interest of the United States in Japan and the Pacific Basin in general. By no means do these goals indicate policy coherency or reflect the implementation of policy associated with these interests. Looking at what the central decision-makers in America do, as opposed to what the American people and government would ideally prefer, presents at times a contrary and kaleidoscopic picture.

Of these five interests outlined above, the United States is confronted with competition from the Soviet Union in all the areas. As Russia expands its military and political influence in the Pacific Basin, the United States will face the possibility of having to broaden its multilateral relationships with the actors of the region in order to accommodate and protect the mutual interest of all nations in the Asian-Pacific region.

When and if the balance in the Pacific Basin moves more heavily in favor of the Soviets and if the United States continues to fail at adequately readdressing the situation, it will require Japan to either reassess its position in relation to the trilateral powers, or to make a much greater autonomous defense effort. The choice will not be free or easy.

It would be in America's national interest to begin to develop a stronger West European-American-Japanese-South Korean cooperative effort. The Chinese would only be offered a position in this association after the People's Republic of China has taken appropriate steps to modernize its military and political structure and indicated its willingness to cooperate with the association. This association between Asia and Europe would present the Soviet Union with a potential economic and military giant on two fronts. This would require a more capable Japanese defense force in the near future and the possible nuclear rearmament of Japan at some later date. With a favorable United States foreign policy reflecting American national interests, Japan's position vis a vis the adjacent Pacific Basin powers will remain favorable toward this western cooperative association.

Associated with U. S. interest in this region are economic linkages between Japan, the United States and ASEAN. These linkages are associated with Japanese and

American dependence on sea transportation for the movement of commercial products and national security forces that protect the rights of free transit through international straits. It is important, if not vital, that both Japan and the United States have access to the various straits adjacent to ASEAN nations. Two straits, the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Lombok, are of strategic importance for the movement of U. S. naval forces from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean region.

It is true that these straits are strategically valuable to U. S. naval forces, but these straits are equally vital to Japan's economy. The interdiction of Japanese shipping in this region would have an eminently disastrous effect on Japan's economy and would to some degree affect the economy of North America - Japan being the second largest trading partner of the U. S. The critical nature of this situation has been expressed by conjectures that from 75 to 85 percent of Japan's vital petroleum needs must transit through these choke points. Japanese tankers, spaced twenty to fifty miles apart, are said to stretch in an unbroken chain from Japanese territorial waters to the Persian Gulf. Japanese tankers also depart Indonesian ports about every five hours, twenty-four hours a day, en route to Japan with other vital, economy-sustaining cargo. A large portion of Japanese exports, approximately 30%, also must transit through the Malaccan or Lombok Straits.

It is evident that the Japanese have direct interests associated with the waters adjacent to many of the ASEAN nations and that they are achieving a degree of security in the region through economic aid and cooperation with ASEAN. Japan, because of its proximity to ASEAN and its reliance on the raw materials available from the region, has made a greater effort to enhance its relations with these nations than has its Western ally.

Today, Japan and the United States together account for a major portion of the foreign trade of the ASEAN group. But it was the Arab oil embargo of 1973, threatening a fragile economy and emphasizing Japan's resource vulnerability, that lead to Japan's renewed interest in these nations of Southeast Asia.

Japan's interest and penetration of the ASEAN economies has its foundations in the East Asian Co - Prosperity Sphere. Today, Japan continues to increase its share of the market through Japanese business and private foreign investments in the region. Japan is Singapore's largest trading partner and in the past has pledged financial aid to all of the ASEAN states for regional industrial projects and the Cambodian and Vietnamese refugee aid programs.

It is likely that these ASEAN nations will require large amounts of foreign economic assistance for future development and that a larger portion of this aid will be supplied by Japan. The aid provided by both Japan and the

United States will be welcomed, but the ASEAN leaders are concerned about the deliberate Soviet/Vietnamese efforts to destabilize Southeast Asia and the appearance of ineffectiveness associated with the United States at this time.

### C. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

In any analysis of the strategic implications of a Japan seeking greater military and political autonomy, in relation to the major Pacific Basin powers, one would have to include the "official" rhetoric articulated by these actors. But in Asia, historically one of the most turbulent and rapidly changing areas of the world, there are inherent dangers associated with this analysis of rhetoric in relationship to the realpolitik of relations between the super-powers.

There is a growing perception among international political scientists that the gap between reality and rhetoric is ever-widening.<sup>51</sup> Therefore, it becomes questionable as to the validity one can place on foreign policy statements made by political heads of state and their appointed spokespersons.

This gap is highly discernible in American foreign policy, especially in relation to Japan. Since about 1975, when then Secretary of Defense Schlesinger visited Tokyo, the American policy has been to publicly criticize Japan

for its passive role in support of American interests in the Pacific Basin. These same sentiments were more recently re-emphasized by the present Defense Secretary Harold Brown, who urged increased defense spending on Japan's part by stating that "coping with expanded Soviet military power was a matter of national security,"<sup>62</sup> and that Japan's defense spending should be fixed with that point in mind, not an arbitrary percentage of GNP. Yet on the other hand, the impression is widely held in Japan that the United States government denies Japan technology in weapons systems that would aid in the standardization between U. S. and Japanese forces.

At the present time Japan only receives technology for weapons development through license for production. This does not introduce new technology into industry, since much of the high technology work is accomplished in the United States and then sent to Japan for assembly. This factor alone is enough to create a worldwide perception of a Japan, now spending more on research and development of weapons than ever before, in the process of assuming a larger role, politically and militarily, in the Pacific and forcing Japan into arms exporting in Asia because of limited production runs of weapons and economy of scale.

This is only one example of the growing gap between the rhetoric and the reality in U. S.-Japan relations and by no

means is it intended to imply that the United States is the only government guilty of increasing the gap.

The Soviet Union's diplomatic approach to foreign policy during the past decade has clearly been a failure, while their military approach to foreign policy has been more productive but diplomatically counter-productive. Their approach - if all else fails, military (power, actions, threats) will prevail - has helped produce a new strategic triangle in Asia that will grow more dynamic and become more vital as the decade progresses. The members of this "new" triangle are China, Japan and the United States.

A gradual military buildup, over the past decade, of Soviet forces in and around Asia raises many questions concerning their intentions. Some speculation is that this is part of an effort to isolate China in Northeast Asia or to realize the Brezhnev concept of "a system of collective security in Asia."

In the first conjecture Soviet moves have produced closer cooperation between the "new strategic triangle" at Soviet expense. Their actions and statements have strengthened the hand of the Japanese defense agency and its supporters abroad and in the foreign ministry. One such conservative party leader in Japan is former Defense Agency Director General Nakasone. He has recently and publicly discussed plans to increase defense spending past



the 1% mark in an effort to increase the existing stockpile of munitions, oil and food to six months. It is also expected that a recent purchase of American planes to replace current jet fighters and patrol aircraft will exceed the 1% limit. The total purchase price was 4.5 billion dollars, spread over a decade.<sup>53</sup> When this 1% of the gross national product barrier is exceeded on a regular basis, it will no longer be important as an accurate indicator of Japanese defense attitudes.

This new diplomatic/military alignment or a strengthening of the existing one in Asia could create increased tension between these regional actors. The signing of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty has already produced a formal protest from Moscow and may have played a significant role in the formation of a treaty between the Soviet Union and Vietnam. The Soviets have a great fear of a U. S. - China-Japan-South Korea military "axis" directed against them. This fear of the Russians is not totally unfounded, since Japanese have close economic ties with both Koreas and have a close association with the Chinese culturally, and an alliance with the United States.<sup>54</sup> The Japanese also express a degree of guilt for the 1930s and World War II, and in an effort to alleviate some of the guilt they have decided to invest in Chinese economic development rather than investing in Siberia.

The Chinese, on the other hand, have made a startling attitude transformation over the past decade toward Japan's approach to rearmament. China's political-military environment has shown growing support for an enlarged Japanese defense base and effort. This change in attitude, on China's part, is related to Peking's desire to acquire Japanese weapons and defense-related technology.

The other inference stated refers to Soviet action and rhetoric toward a collective security system. Soviet buildup in Asia can also be largely attributed to their perception of vulnerability in the Soviet Far East due to the Sino-Soviet border conflicts of 1969. In an effort to stabilize their position in East Asia the Soviets over the past decade have introduced increasing quantities of naval aviation forces to the region, while reinforcing their divisions along the Sino-Soviet border. This force intensification could also be due to a perception of increased security on Russia's western front.

There may be a linkage between European security and Asian insecurity for the Soviets. In recent years the Soviet Union has signed nonaggression treaties, formalized borders and acronyms such as SALT and MBFR have become the language of negotiations in Europe. There is also an increasing acceptance of the Warsaw Pact as a dependable part of their defense in Europe.

When Soviet action in Europe is contrasted to that of Asia the picture becomes clear. Diplomatic rigidity has been the case and not the exception in Asia. Territorial disputes are not discussed and borders are frozen in respect to China as well as Japan is the official Soviet position. This position of rigidity led to a Japanese rejection of the 1978 peace treaty with Moscow. Six months later the Japanese signed a peace treaty with China that included an anti-hegemony clause bluntly directed at the Soviet Union.

The United States' reaction has been the acceptance of an implied alliance that is indicative of the rhetoric-reality gap. While it is unlikely that the United States will overtly ally with China, the rhetoric from official sources is quite vivid. One hears phrases similar to "any nation which seeks to weaken or isolate you (China) in world affairs assumes a stance counter to American interest;" or statements made by American officials expressing that the U. S. is committed to "advance our (U. S.-China) many parallel strategic and bilateral interest." Rhetoric - not backed by action - is extremely dangerous. It is likely to heighten Moscow's perceptions of insecurity in Asia, while promoting "worst case" Soviet military planning which will aggravate Chinese and American

perceptions of the Soviet threat. This could all lead to greater disharmony in diplomatic communications and an escalation of instability within the region.

There is another inference linked to Soviet expansion into Asia that warrants examination. It is related to the perception of Soviet foreign policy and the numerous factors associated with it. It is also linked to the fact that the Soviet Union has in recent years become a net importer of material and grain, decreasing its once independent position of self-sufficiency. This vulnerability is especially critical as the Soviets increase their efforts to develop the mineral and energy resource of Asia to supply the European-Russian economy. This all leads to the strategic importance the Soviets place on their Pacific forces and their dependence on sea transportation for power projection and commercial needs.

Soviet ocean policy in the Pacific Basin cannot be divorced from the overall Soviet military and political strategy. In the Pacific Basin the Soviet Union faces increasing challenge because of the vulnerability of its defensive posture in Asia. No other maritime power relies so greatly on access through and to the water lying off the shores of other states. Only northeastern Siberia lies directly off an ocean. The U.S.S.R. in a world of 200-mile territorial seas (vice economic zone) would have no

southerly routes for exit from the Sea of Japan. Only Siberian routes would be fully under Soviet control. This situation could limit the navigation of the Soviet Navy and merchant marine. It would restrict Soviet fishing and oceanographic activities. Albeit all western maritime powers would also be significantly restricted by a 200-mile territorial sea extension, none would be as constrained as the U.S.S.R., making the Soviet position weaker vis a vis western maritime strength.

There are 121 international straits which are wider than six but less than 24 miles.<sup>55</sup> These straits connect major bodies of water. The Soviet strait position is very similar to those of the western maritime powers and very dissimilar from those of states such as Indonesia, which seeks to extend its control over neighboring waterways. The Soviet stand primarily benefits the Soviet Navy which would retain favorable passage rights through the straits of the Sea of Japan and the Indonesian Straits. Their conviction is clear - coastal states should have no right to suspend passage through international straits.

Related to Soviet current ocean policy is the current fisheries dispute between the Soviet Union and Japan. This is a mixture of oceanic, political and economic factors that change frequently. There appear to be two major issues of focus: safety of fishing operations and the disputed Kurile Islands.

At the termination of hostilities in 1945, the Soviet Union enjoyed a powerful international position in Asia and was able to assert control over the disputed territory and also demand regulation of fishing in the Northwestern Pacific Ocean. Fishing in the Northwestern Pacific Ocean for salmon, herring, crab, and other marine resources also reflects political and economic interaction and is regulated by a joint Soviet-Japanese commission created in 1956. Until the end of World War II the Japanese enjoyed a relative position of dominance that was achieved through treaty rights granted by the Russians after their defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. However, after World War II, Soviet fishing industry development and increased political strength reaffirmed a stronger Soviet position in subsequent negotiations. In fact, the Soviets have been "heavy handed" in their approach to the fishing dispute since 1958, closing many areas to Japanese fishing and placing heavy restriction on salmon and crab catches.

Russia's 200-mile economic zone and limits placed on Japan's catches have devastated the fishing industries of Japan and Korea. This Japanese industry, which is ranked number one in terms of catch per ton of equipment, and contributes over \$7 billion yearly to the Japanese economy, has some 5,500 fishing and processing boats idle. Canneries have cut back operations and the related ship repairs industry is suffering.

Today, however, the Soviet position has been shifted by a Japan that is a major economic power with industrial and technological capabilities that are needed by the Soviet Union. This new position enhances Japanese leverage when dealing with the Soviets.

The linkages between the issue of safe fishing and the dispute over the "northern territories" has wide dimensions and also encompasses political, economic and security issues. It involves domestic politics as well as foreign diplomatic policy. The Soviets maintain that the problem is an American creation, in a cold war atmosphere, and that this issue was settled permanently by the World War II peace treaty.

The conclusion of a peace treaty between the Soviet Union and Japan depends on mutual resolution of the "northern territories" issue, which also affects the bilateral fishing relations of the adversaries. The disagreement concerns the sovereignty of four islands in the Kurile chain: the Habomai Group and Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorofu. Varying interpretations of the secret Yalta agreement, the Cairo and Potsdam declarations, and the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 are the bases for the dispute.

The Soviet position reflects a concern for the possible effects a territorial concession would have on the long-standing Sino-Soviet border dispute and a Soviet security

system based on buffer states protecting vital areas. In rebuttal, the Japanese position contends that historical sovereignty over the islands and subjective interpretation of the international agreements justify this claim. Since the early 1960s the Russians have required a complete withdrawal of U. S. forces from Japan before any agreement can be concluded.

As mentioned earlier, security plays a major role in Soviet considerations regarding the northern territories. Recent events in the Pacific Basin have altered the delicate balance of peaceful coexistence between Soviet regional factions and the new trilateral powers. A Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, followed by Soviet naval forces visiting the region, the Vietnamese invasion into Kampuchea and the Chinese incursion into Vietnam have significantly threatened the stability of this region and world peace.

From Subic Bay in the south through Taiwan, the Ryukyu Islands, to the northern tip of Hokkaido, the United States poses a threat to Russia's eastern front. In the Pacific Basin there are no significant naval powers outside the superpowers. A few, including Japan, may possess sufficient forces to restrict or impede innocent passage through strategically vital and narrow channels. But by controlling the Kurile Island chain and the northern tip of Hokkaido,



the Soviet Pacific Fleet and Russian merchant and fishing fleets could assure themselves safe passage from mainland bases into the Pacific without having to utilize any foreign power controlled straits. With declining American presence and corresponding Japanese defense capabilities, the Soviets could soon enjoy a position of dominance once secured by the United States.

The implication of these Soviet actions extends beyond Northereast Asia. There may soon be indications that Soviet military actions are indeed aiming at securing warm water ports in Southeast Asia (from Kampuchea to the Malaccan Strait is a very short distance) and Asia. With the control of just two straits, Malacca and Hormuz, the Russians could threaten the dominance of a major portion of the industrial world. This action is not at all unrealistic in light of a recent CIA report indicating that Soviet oil production will drop soon and that there may be reserves of oil in the adjacent waters of Southeast Asia. As in the past, if Soviet diplomatic attempts to secure their interest in these regions fail, then military action is likely to prevail. In other words, if the carrot is not taken, then the stick will be employed effectively.

#### D. THE U. S. RESPONSE

In the Pacific Basin U. S. foreign policy has become so atomized that it is in danger of becoming severely weakened. The American government must not lose sight of reality. Americans are confronting a gigantic military power that has "...successfully harnessed the energies of their people toward a single, well-defined and consistently articulated goal - the achievement of a decisive degree of military superiority over the West..."<sup>56</sup> The Americans cannot forget that communist ideology drives the Russian machine. The inference that the Soviet Union is moving toward capitalism is not true. Since 1972 the Soviets have backed wars and revolutions in Angola, Ethiopia/Somalia, Afghanistan, South Yemen, and conceivably Iran.

To deal effectively with the Soviet Union one must operate on the same level and assume they are not about to change their fundamental thinking in the future. The number of years where relations between the United States and the Soviet Union could be thought of as "good" are remarkably few. Administration after administration has sought detente or a limited peaceful coexistence in its own way. These approaches to Soviet-American relations are marked by the designations each Secretary of State has bestowed on their philosophy toward these relationships: Dean Acheson's containment, John Foster Dulles' brinkmanship, and Henry Kissinger's realpolitik.

It appears that in the Pacific Basin American foreign policy has lost its compass. It is obvious that a nation as great as the United States, in many respects a model for much of the world, can ill afford to lose its will, or its might, to the same extent that it has lost its compass.

## V. CONCLUSIONS: WHAT THE INDICATORS AND VARIABLES SUGGEST

Throughout Asia events of political instability, economic and resource uncertainty in combination with Soviet aggression have added new emphasis to Japan's public debate of security related issues. The effect of these factors on Japanese perceptions of military power as a possible alternative for resource security has been a factor leading to open discussion among many of the governmental officials and in much of the public sector. The changes that may occur in the future as a result of this increased consciousness toward security will have widespread regional and global impact.

When and if these changes take place the United States must be prepared to act in accordance with and not lose sight of its vital national interests in this region. It should be conveyed clearly to American allies that not all interests in this region are vital to the survival of America. The government of Japan should also realize that for Japan, as a nation, to remain a vitally important ally it must assume a greater responsibility and a more positive approach toward the Japanese-American mutual security system. American interests, as well as Japanese interests, are at stake. U. S. armed forces in the region are there to protect those interest in a prioritized

fashion and their major responsibility is not to provide for the defense of a large economic power that perceives American forces as a canopy deployed for the benefit of Japan.

Both nations must also analyze the changing strategic environment of Asia with more realism while avoiding the pit-falls of unfounded rhetoric. If the United States is expecting Japan to increase its defensive capabilities then it must be firm in this commitment in all areas of bilateral relations and provide Japan with the necessary support: and if Japanese perceive their survival as being in jeopardy then they must be willing to pay the political and economical price associated with security.

At the present time it is not possible to state positively that Japan seeks to become a major independent military force within the Pacific Basin region. From the evidence presented however, it appears that a decision on Japan's part to pursue a course of action less dependent on the United States has been reached. It can be concluded that Japan has been moving towards greater autonomy since 1973, when Japanese leaders clearly rejected their uncritical acceptance of foreign policy objectives imposed upon them by the Americans. Along with the defense relationship that Japan and the United States share, the Japanese still cherish close relations with as many third world countries as possible.

This increasing detachment from the United States on Japan's part, does not extend as deeply into the areas of economics and security. The Japanese are still heavily dependent on the United States in both of these areas. Like many of Japan's policies, there are usually clear distinctions between politics on one hand and security and economics on the other. The lingering political dependency on the United States is most likely linked to Japan's perception of Soviet intentions in Asia and the Soviet military build-up in the Pacific.

This growing perception of a Soviet threat has also strengthened the right wing of the Liberal Democratic Party and caught the interest of a powerful force in Japan, business. Many of the business leaders of Japan can perceive Japan as a regional arms producer/supplier modeled after the nations of France and Israel. The market, China, ASEAN and the Middle East (along with a variety of resource rich third world nations) is one of high profit potential and would serve both the defense needs of the supplier and the client, while having altruistic connotations by using the correct public relations campaign. The first cautious step on this road towards indigenous arms production for export has been taken. Government to government cooperation and Japanese technology transfers to the United States in the areas of cruise missiles and

PGM guidance systems has set the precedence for future overt military technology and equipment transfers. The export barrier of the Japanese constitution has either been reinterpreted or ignored.

Japan's potential as an arms producer/supplier is enormous and could also enhance the natural trading patterns between it and ASEAN. This trade could as well lessen some of the pressure now exerted on Japan in the area of scarce resources and would also dampen the threat perception that some nations may have towards a rearmed Japan. Claiming a neutralist position while a sufficient defensive force is established, Japan could maintain a high degree of armed readiness and military strength while citing Switzerland as an example of a highly armed nation that maintained a neutralist position in the world through two wars.

Although the evidence for the hypothesis that Japan will overcome the political objections to accepting more responsibility for its security and the associated economic cost is merely beginning to accumulate, it must be remembered that the Japanese approach new policy directions with the utmost caution, while allowing ample maneuvering room in all directions. It is likely that this new role for Japan will be approached in the same manner. It can be

anticipated that the Japanese will move slowly but surely towards a position where they will make wider use of their tremendous intellectual and economic potential in the service of their greatest need, national security.



## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> In any survey of literature on contemporary Japanese foreign and domestic problems there are recurring factors that are listed. This list is a summation of those factors thought to be relevant to this work.

<sup>2</sup> Paul F. Langer and Richard Moorsteen, The U. S./ Japanese Military Alliance: Japanese Perceptions and the Prospective Impact of Evolving U. S. Military Doctrines and Technologies, (The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1975), p. 6.

<sup>3</sup> "Japan in the '80s," Financial Times, July 17, 1978, p. 14.

<sup>4</sup> Basically a statement of principles, the major points are: to realize world peace by supporting the United Nations; to stabilize the livelihood of the people, instill patriotism, and establish a firm foundation for insuring the nation's security; to consolidate defense power gradually and within the limits necessary for defense in consonance with the nation's ability to do so and the circumstances in which the nation finds itself; and to rely on the Japan-U. S. security treaty as a keystone for dealing with external aggression until the time comes when the United Nations can prevent aggression effectively. John K. Emmerson and Leonard A. Humphreys, Will Japan Rearm (AEI-Hoover Policy Study 9, Washington, D. C., 1973) p. 20.

<sup>5</sup> Defense of Japan, (Japanese Defense Agency, Tokyo), July 1978, p. 50.

<sup>6</sup> 1972 figures from : Langer & Moorsteen, The U. S./ Japanese Military Alliance, Rand P-5393, 1975, p. 45. 1979 figures from: "Japan's Defense: Call to Arms," Far East Economic Review, March 14, 1980, p. 21. Public opinion polls are almost an obsession in Japan.

7 Public discussion of defense related topics and support for the U. S.-Japanese treaty and the SDF have never been stronger in recent history. The public support for the M.S.T. has almost doubled since 1974. This support has led the way for qualitative improvements in the SDF and a revival of militaristic and traditional values. "Japan's Growing Strategic Role," Aviation Week & Space Technology, Jan 14, 1980, p. 36. "Japan's Defense," Far East Economic Review, March 14, 1980, p. 21.

8 The leader of the Federation of Employees' Associations, Takeoki Sakurada (and a close friend of P. M. Ohira) recently stated in the Far East Economic Review that "Japan should produce more defense arms itself..." and the Committee on Defense and Production asked for a doubling of expenditures in defense related research and development programs. This would indicate a need or function for the military on at least a domestic level if not an international level. "Japan's Defense," Far East Economic Review, March 14, 1980, p. 21.

9 During 1976 Soviet air activity increased four-fold in the number of "Tokyo express" flights and the Soviet air activity in general became more diversified. Flights requiring mid-air refueling were increased, low altitude approaches to Japan were increased and electronic counter-measures were employed more frequently.

10 A more detailed explanation of the Yamato clan god can be found by referring to: Nobutaka Ike, Japan: The New Superstate, (Freeman and Co., San Francisco, 1973), and Guilford A. Dudley, A History of Eastern Civilizations, (Wiley and Son, Inc., New York, 1973).

11 Over the years since the defeat of World War II, the Japanese have gained back the self-respect that they once had. More and more the Japanese think of themselves as being superior to other nationalities. A Japanese character study by Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemums and the Sword (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1946) brings out these and other personality traits of the Japanese.

12 "Japanese Tours Oil Countries," The New York Times, January 15, 1978, p. 34, col. 4.

13 Journal of Commerce, Information Bank of the New York Times Company, June 16, 1978, p. 1, col. 6.

- 14 New York Times, August 6, 1978, p. 1.
- 15 In the Far East Economic Review of March 14, 1980, p. 18 reported that Japan had exceeded the 1% level of GNP by 0.5%, a first in the past decade. However, this uses a different method of accounting.
- 16 Far East Economic Review, March 14, 1980, p. 53.
- 17 From 1974 to 1978 the Japanese defense budget rose 40%, Senate Sub-Committee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, 1978. The figures for 1979 are comparable to those of 1978.
- 18 The reality of this situation can be expressed by facts such as: Japanese tankers, spaced twenty to fifty miles apart, stretch in an unbroken chain from Japanese territorial waters to the Persian Gulf. Japanese tankers depart Indonesian ports every five hours, twenty-four hours a day, en route to Japan. One-third of Japan's exports/imports go through the Malaccan Straits or the Lombok Straits. Asia Pacific Community, Winter 1978-79, p. 27; Parameters, Sept. 1978, p. 18.
- 19 An excellent study entitled, Japan: Economic Growth, Resources Scarcity and Environmental Constraints, by Edward A. Olsen (Westview Press, 1978) is credited for the basic economic aspects to these options. Mr. Olsen does a fine job of stating the options facing Japan today, to which I added little, although I do disagree with him on the option Japan is likely to pursue in the long run.
- 20 Eliot Janeway in a recent New York Times article entitled, "The Oil Shortage is a Malthusian Myth," stated that Japanese inventories of oil are presently at 102 days. It is assumed that other inventories of scarce resources are also being stockpiled. New York Times, February 28, 1980, p. 16F.
- 21 In 1938 Japan proclaimed a new order in East Asia that was anti-Communist. It included Manchukuo and China under Japanese hegemony and was extended to the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." This area would be economically self-sufficient and free from Western exploitation. Other examples of Japanese military action as national policy are: Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, and Japanese colonialism in Taiwan and Korea in the late 19th Century. It is interesting to note that the Japanese, in both the cases of Russia and China, led surprise attacks against them.

<sup>22</sup> Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 14, 1980,  
p. 40.

<sup>23</sup> Kurisu was fired in 1978 for numerous reasons - the most serious being publicly pointing out serious gaps in Japan's defenses. Far East Economic Review, March 14, 1980, p. 19; Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 14, 1980, p. 40.

<sup>24</sup> Foreign Policy, Winter 1978-79, p. 16.

<sup>25</sup> Rand Study R-1030-ISA, "Japanese National Security Policy - Domestic Determinate," by Paul F. Langer, June 1972, p. 64.

<sup>26</sup> There are numerous books available on this subject. Three recent publications found were extremely interesting, Tagdish N. Bhagwati, The New International Economic Order: The North-South Debate, 1978; Stanley Hoffman, Primacy or World Order: American Foreign Policy Since the Cold War, 1978; and William Irwin Thompson, Evil and World Order, 1976.

<sup>27</sup> Figures here would not be an accurate indication of Japan's dependency because they vary with the source used. It can be said with reasonable certainty that the Japanese are "totally" dependent on foreign sources for petroleum, bauxite, nickel ore, platinum, palladium, rhodium, aluminum, iron ore and uranium.

<sup>28</sup> In 1979 Japan increased its petroleum "consumption," now purchasing about 30% of the available world exports of oil. Source: Asian Survey, January 1980, p. 44.

<sup>29</sup> Defense of Japan, (Japanese Defense Agency: Tokyo, July 1979).

<sup>30</sup> The interview took place in Tokyo and was reported in The Christian Science Monitor, July 19, 1978, p. 9.  
(Underlining is added)

<sup>31</sup> Aviation Week and Space Technology stated that in 1978 the guidelines for this proposal were first approved and the conclusion of the agreement came out in a later article. Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 14, 1980, p. 36 and February 11, 1980, p. 9.

32 Japan has for many years been able to transfer numerous items that were politically acceptable as exports that did not violate its governmental policies on arms transfers, but items that did have potential use as military weapons, e.g., high grade tempered steel pipe, transferred to the FRC.

33 It should be noted that Switzerland has maintained its neutral position in the world through a high degree of armament and military readiness.

34 Extensive arms control studies have recently been completed on the use of PGMs resulting from the Yom Kippur War of 1973. Two studies that address arms in general, and PGMs in detail, are: Ann Hessing Cahn, et al, Controlling Future Arms Trade (New York: McGraw Hill, 1980's Project, Council on Foreign Relations, 1977); and James H. Noyes, The Clouded Lens (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, Persian Gulf Security and U. S. Policy, 1979).

35 Far East Economic Review, March 14, 1980, p. 57.

36 The Japanese economy is just starting to recover from a recession that started in late 1976. In 1977 twelve Japanese shipyards went bankrupt when export orders fell 40%. At that time there were about 1.2 million unemployed in Japan and this figure rose to nearly 2 million in late 1978. It is interesting to note that during the recession the Shipbuilding Association of Japan proposed to the Japanese government a plan to scrap vessels older than 15 years, and increase the military purchases of ships. Source: The Financial Times, February 14, 1978, p. 16 and The Economist of London, August 19, 1978, p. 50.

37 Two papers that offer a more detailed account of French arms sales and production factors/determinants are: "Behind French Arms Sales" by Capt. M. E. Walsh, December 1977, and "Determinants of French Arms Sales Behavior: Implications for National and International Security" by Edward A. Kolodziej of the University of Illinois. Neither of these papers is known to have been published.

38 Dr. Henry Kissinger has perceived the potential for this and stated so. He remarked in July 1979 that the flow of history is going to leave Europe behind and shift to the Pacific region. He also stated in American Foreign Policy (1977) p. 427, that, "...the impulse for regional integration (in Asia) is apparent..."

39 These benefits were paraphrased from a French slogan in 1973, explaining the reasons for arms exports. The slogan is from Ventes d'armes: Une Politique, by Jean-Francois Dubou (1974) p. 146. English translation taken from Walsh, "Behind French Arms Sales."

40 Orbis, Summer 1977, p. 198.

41 The Financial Times featured many surveys in 1978 and 1979 that pointed out the economic prosperity of the Asian region. One article of interest concerns Japanese-South Korean economic cooperation. The Financial Times, May 3, 1978, p. 17.

42 "Japan Feels the Heat in the Industrial Kitchen," World Business Weekly, April 7, 1980, p. 22.

43 Just examining the 1980 budget, this figure of \$9.7 billion equates to 5.4% of the national budget. If one compares the years 1977 and 1980 one finds a 59% increase in defense spending (1977: \$5.7 billion, 1980: \$9.7 billion). Base figures compiled from Aviation Week and Space Technology, October 29, 1979, p. 67, and January 7, 1980, p. 21.

44 Ibid., p. 51.

45 An extensive survey of Japan's nuclear capabilities can be found in John E. Endicott, Japan's Nuclear Option: Political, Technical and Strategic Factors, 1975, pp. 116-117.

46 There are now over 25 plants in operation, under construction or temporarily shut down in Japan. Ibid., p. 241.

47 ORBIS, Summer 1977, p. 198.

48 The toppling of Premier Nasayoshi Ohira's government on 16 May 1980 adds a degree of uncertainty to the five-year defense plan that detailed the Japanese Defense Agency's modernization program. The plan called for a \$12.5 billion procurement program among the three military services. It is of interest to note that the announcement of the program came at virtually the same time of the Diet's no confidence vote on Ohira.

49 Stephen Krasner, *Defending the National Interest* (Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 12.

50 Los Angeles Times, April 25, 1979.

51 Lucian Pye expressed this idea at the 33rd Annual Conference of the World Affairs Council of Northern California, May 4-6, 1979.

52 Los Angeles Times, August 19, 1979, p. 1.

53 New York Times, August 6, 1978, p. 12; Foreign Policy, Winter 78-79, Michael Pillsbury article, p. 9.

54 Two-thirds of South Korea's foreign trade is with Japan and 40% of North Korea's current debt is owed to Japan, Franklin R. Weinstein, U. S.-Japan Relations and the Security of East Asia: the Next Decade (Westview Press, 1978), p. 1980.

55 Soviet Oceans Development, U. S. Congress Committee on Commerce, 1976, p. 289. Of these 121 straits, only five are of major importance: Strait of Malacca, Drake Passages, Strait of Gibraltar, Strait of Hormuz and Tsushima Straits.

56 Navy Times, September 24, 1979, p. 33.

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
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